Volume 71

Issue 1

Article 12

December 1968

Master-Servant--Right of Action by Employer Against Tort-feaser
of Employee
John Campbell Palmer IV
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
John C. Palmer IV, Master-Servant--Right of Action by Employer Against Tort-feaser of Employee, 71 W.
Va. L. Rev. (1968).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol71/iss1/12

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Palmer: Master-Servant--Right of Action by Employer Against Tort-feaser o

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

defense that his order to report for induction was invalid because
of a procedural error committed by the administrative agency in
the classification process."1
The Warner case illustrates that it is most difficult indeed to
establish that a selective service board exceeded its jurisdiction in
deciding a particular case. This is because the local board can guard
its province by showing that certain facts existed to substantiate its
conclusion. As a result, the efficacy of contesting the board's decision
on the grounds that it exceeded its jurisdiction may be seriously
questioned. Rather, constitutional arguments, such as those set
forth in Wolff, Gabriel, and Petersen could in the future be a more
successful way to assure judicial review of one's selective service
classification.
Gary Gordon Markham

Master-Servant-Right of Action by Employer Against
Tort-feaser of Employee
West, allegedly negligent in driving his car, was involved in a
collision. The driver of the other vehicle, an employee of Snow,
was killed and six passengers, also employed by Snow, were injured.
Snow brought an action against West to recover the profits lost from
his business due to the loss of services of these employees. The trial
court entered judgment for West, and Snow appealed. Held, judgment affirmed. This is a problem of interference with a contractual
relation, that of employer-employee. To be actionable, the interference must be intentional and not an inadvertent or incidental invasion of the employer's contractual interest. An employer will not
be permitted to recover for the loss of services of an employee
negligently injured. Snow v. West, 440 P.2d 864 (Ore. 1968).
The action permitting the master to recover for the loss of
services of an employee who has been injured by a third party is an
ancient one. It can be traced to early Roman law where the head
of the household could bring an action for violence committed upon
his wife, his children, his slaves, or other members of his establishment, on the premise that they were identifiable with him, so that
21

Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 712 (N.D. Calif. 1968).
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the wrong was one to himself.' Under early English common law,
the wrong giving rise to the action consisted of actual damage to the
master by reason of loss of service.2 The rationale was that the
master had a property in the service rather than an interest in the

servant's person.3 The action was not for the direct injury, on which
only the injured servant could recover, but for the resulting damage
to the master. Since it was not actionable per se, it was necessary to
allege a per quod, i.e. per quod servitium amisit.4
The response to the common law action in this country can hardly
be characterized as favorable. Although a number of states have

recognized its existence, they have done so chiefly through dicta;5
however, the right of action has been recognized by statute in
California and Oklahoma.6 Apparently the earliest appellate decision
concerning the action in the United States was rendered in 1805;' but
it was not until the latter half of the century that usage of the action
became noticeable. In the twentieth century there has been considerable opposition to it,8 and courts are presently re-examining the

1W. PROSSER, TORTS § 123 at 952 (3rd ed. 1964); see Wampler v.
Palmerton, 439 P.2d 601, 605 (Ore. 1968).
2 In Robert Mary's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 895, 898-899 (K. B. 1612), the
leading English case, Lord Coke said:
[I]f my servant is beat, the master shall not have an action for this
battery, unless the battery is so great that by reason thereof he loses
the service of his servant, but the servant himself for every small
battery shall have an action; and the reason of the difference is, that
the master has not any damage by the personal beating of his servant,
but by reason of a per quod, viz. per quod servitium, etc., amisit; so
that the original act is not the cause of his action, but the consequent
upon it, viz. the loss of his service is the cause of his action; for be
the battery greater or less, if the master doth not lose the service
of his servant, he shall not have an action.
IId.; see 2 MELBOURNE U.L. Rnv. 413 (1960), relating the recent conflict in English courts concerning whether the relationship of the servant to
his master was one of property or of contract.
4 Robert Mary's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 895 (K. B. 1612).
- Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Electric Co., 86 NJ.L. 26,
90 A. 1062 (1914); Tidd v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422, 122 N.E. 247 (1919);
Trow v. Thomas, 70 Vt. 580, 41 A. 652 (1898); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 802
(1958).
'CAL.

CIv. CODE ANN. § 49(c) (Deering 1960); OKRA. STAT. ANN. tit.

76, §78(4) (1965).
Voss v. Howard, 1 D.C. (1 Cranch) 251 (1805) (master has no
right of action for assault and battery unless some loss of service results).
1 Seavy, Liability to Master for Negligent Harm to Servant, WASH.
U.L.Q. 309 (1956); Brett, Consortium and Servitium, 29 Ausm. L. J. 321,
389, 428 (1955); Note, Action Per Quod Servitium Amisit, 26 AusTL. L.J.
122 (1952).
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action to determine the need for it in the light of present-day circumstances."
One of the basic problems confronting the action is the determination of limits for its coverage. The action originated in a state
of society where service was not a matter of contract, but of
status."0 However, the relationship of the master and his servant
has changed considerably during the past several centuries. As a
result, several courts have restricted recovery for loss of service to
the masters of menial or domestic servants in an attempt to conform to the original basis for the action," while other courts have
expanded the original concept to permit a variety of employers to
recover." Moreover, the existence of an actual binding contract for
the services between the master and the servant has never been
deemed necessary.'"
Another fundamental problem with the common law action is
the determination of when it is to be applied and what rationale will
support its application. The loss of service due to intentional injury
was being compensated at a time when the concept of negligence
was merely an embryo. As the latter concept burgeoned, negligent
injuries to the servant presented difficulties for the courts until it
was eventually determined that there was no distinction between
willful and negligent injuries in this action. 4 However, when the
relationship of master and servant became more clearly one of
contract, courts labored to determine an analytical approach on
which to base recovery. With negligence being couched in concepts
of "duty" and "foreseeability," many courts were hesitant to include
the loss of services within these concepts and thus concluded that
no duty was owed to the employer' 5 or that such consequences were
9 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 153 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1946),
affd 332 U.S. 301 (1947), where the action is referred to as "an anomaly
in the law."
10 Cowen, The Consequences of the Commonwealth v. Quince, 19 AusTL.
L.J. 2 (1945).
1 United States v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 64 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C.
1946); Burgess v. Carpenter, 2 S.C. 7, 16 Am. R. 643 (1870).
12 Darmour Productions Corp. v. Herbert M. Baruch Corp.,
135 Cal.
App. 351, 27 P.2d 664 (1933); Woodward v. Washburn, 3 Denio 369 (N.Y.
1846).
13 Evans v. Walton, L.R. 2 C.P. 615 (1867); Commonwealth v. Quince,
68 Commw. L.R. 227 (Austl. 1944).
,4 Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 155 F.2d 992 (3rd Cir. 1946); Martinez
v. Gerber,
133 Eng. Rep. 1069 (C.P. 1841).
15 E.q., Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 309
(1927).
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too remote to permit recovery." Moreover, several courts, after
examining intentional injuries to the servant, concluded that if there
were no intent to harm the master through injuring his servant or
no malice was directed towards the master, then he should not be
compensated. 7
West Virginia has had two cases in which a master has sought
recovery based on an injury to his servant. In one instance, a
corporation sought recovery for the loss of services of an employee due to an assault and battery committed upon him. The
court held that an employer could recover from one who intentionally harms his servant where such injury results in a loss of
services to the employer." In the other case, however, the defendant's conduct was not intentional. More particularly, the employee in this case was killed by the defendant's negligent operation
of a train.' 9 In discussing the plaintiff's contention that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause in a chain of causation
resulting in damage to the plaintiff, the court reasoned that such
damages were too remote and indirect to support a recovery. The
court further ruled that no "legal duty is . . .owed by the tort-

feasor to the employer. It is only where an injury is intentionally
calculated to harm the employer in his contractural relations that
recovery may be had."2 This view seemingly coincides with that
16Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d
277, 282 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941).
17Id.; United States v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 64 F. Supp. 289
(E.D.N.C. 1946); Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 280
Mass. 282, 182 N.E. 477 (1932); see The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d
Cir. 1927).
18 Coal Land Development Co. v. Chidester, 86 W. Va. 561, 103 S.E.

923 (1920).
19 Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d

277, 282 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941). The employer

sought recovery for expenses paid and increased payments made to the
Workmen's Compensation Fund due to the death of the employee, but the

court held that the employer had no right to indemnity or subrogation in lieu
of an express statutory grant.
At common law recovery was denied for loss of services where the

death of the servant occurred. See Higgins v. Butcher, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K. B.

1872).20

Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d

277, 282 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941). Ironically, the

court acknowledged neither the common law action nor the previous West

Virginia decision, stating:

Where a husband is allowed to recover for loss sustained by injuries to
his wife, or a father for loss of service or expense in the cure of his
child, the tort-feasor is held responsible, not because of the contractual

aspect of the relationship, but because of the special treatment given by
the common law to the particular social status involved. As to these,
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of the Oregon court in its decision that an employer cannot recover
for the loss of services of an employee who is negligently injured
by a third party.
In addition to this decision, there is other authority for the
proposition that recovery for loss of service can be maintained by
a master or employer only where a wrongful intent or malice was
directed at the employer, or where the tortfeasor was aware of the
master-servant relationship.2 ' The substitution of this rule in place
of the common law rule obviates the difficulties previously encountered. Thus, where the employee's injury is negligently caused, it
eliminates the problem of the faint foreseeability that such an injury
would harm the employer and the problem of a vague duty owed to
the employer. Where the employee's injury is intentionally caused
and no harmful intent or malice is directed to the employer, but such
harm is merely felt vicariously, recovery would be denied. Also, the
question of limiting or expanding the common law concept of
"master" vanishes since an injury to the employee, committed with
the intention of harming the employer's business, would permit a
recovery by all types of employers.
Limiting the employer's right of recovery to situations where
his employee was intentionally injured as a means to harm the employer's business interests may not eliminate all problems. For instance, it may seem rather anomalous if an employer made liable
under the doctrine of respondeat superior could not bring an action
per quod servitium amisit in appropriate circumstances.22 Nevertheless, the need for vindicating the master's proprietary interest in

the tortfeasor is held responsible because he is expected to recognize the
natural and probable consequences of his wrong. (Citations omitted).
However, no such special treatment is given by our law to the relationship
of employer and employee. And, until the legislature deems it wise to
create a specific social employer-employee status, with additional obligations and immunities thereunto appertaining, the ordinary rules of tort law
will here apply. (Emphasis added).
21 United States v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 64 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C.
1946); Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross Towboat Co., 280 Mass.
282, 182 N.E. 477 (1932); see The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir.
1927).
22 Cowen, The Consequences of the Commonwealth v. Quince, 19 AUSTL.
L.J. 2, 9 (1945). The doctrine of respondeat superior is the converse of the
doctrine per quod servitium amisit as far as the employer is concerned. Imposing liability on the employer in the former situation and denying recovery to him in the latter is justifiable. Due to the employer's control
over his servant, courts readily find that the employer could foresee the
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the service of a dependent servant, based on a psuedo-family relationship, no longer exists.2 3 The necessary shift in the function of the
action is to the protection of the employer's business interests, and

the cases indicate that the law has moved in that direction.
John Campbell Palmer IV

Pleading-Amendment of Pleadings by Leave of Court
The prior practice of "gamesmanship" in pleading has been replaced by a judicious emphasis on substance rather than on form
under the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules focus
on the orderly presentation of all the relevant issues.' Under the
Rules, substantive law need no longer seem to be "secreted in the
interstices of procedure." 2 Unfortunately, lawyers, and even judges
are often too busy with the business of the day to lay aside the
habits of decades. Perhaps, more for this reason than any other, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals gave a restrictive treatment
to Rule 15(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure in
deciding the case of Perdue v. S. J. Groves and Sons Co.' The
pertinent facts of that case are as follows:
Plaintiffs, who were landowners in Huntington, West Virginia,
alleged their home was damaged as the proximate result of depossibility of his servant injuring a third party. Conversely, when the servant
is injured by a third party, it is difficult to find that the tortfeasor should
foresee an injury to a person with whom the servant has merely a contractual relation. This is subject to the criticism that a tortfeasor should be
held to foresee such an injury since most people are employed; however,
courts usually hold that this is too remote. Another rationale commonly
employed is that the employer usually is the one who is best equipped to
bear the loss, whether his servant injures a third person or a third person
injures his servant. Thus while the two doctrines may be symmetrical factually, the rules of the courts result in the balance being weighted unequally.
23 City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 1,
5, 10 A.2d 434, 436 (1940). See Note, The Action Per Quod Servitium
Amisit, 26 AUSTL. L. J.122 (1952). See also United States v. Standard Oil
Co., 153 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1946), aff'd 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (the
modem relationship of employer-employee is basically one of contract).
IThe Rules contemplate that a decision will be made on the merits
of the controversy. Morever, Rule 1 provides that the Rules "shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of any
action." W. VA. R. Civ. P. 1.
2 "So great is the ascendency of the Law of Actions in the infancy of
Courts of Justice, that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually
secreted in the interstices of procedure." Sm HENRY MAINE, EARLY LAW AND
CUSTOM 389 (1907).
3161

S.E.2d 250 (W. Va. 1968).
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